

# FETCHBENCH: SYSTEMATIC IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPRIETARY PREFETCHERS

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
## UNKNOWN PREFETCHERS → UNCLEAR SECURITY LEVEL

CPUs implement proprietary prefetchers. Prior work identified **side-channel vulnerabilities** in individual prefetchers, but no systematic analysis has been conducted.


We study prefetcher security systematically:

- RQ1** How to identify and characterize prefetchers?
- RQ2** What prefetchers are regularly implemented?
- RQ3** What are the security implications?

## OUR PREFETCHER TAXONOMY




## FETCHBENCH FRAMEWORK



## IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION RESULTS

- Characterized **19 CPUs** from 7 vendors
- 1-3 prefetchers per CPU
- New:** SMS prefetcher
- The newer, the more complex




## FIRST OBSERVED SMS PREFETCHER IN THE WILD

We are the first to identify a Spatial Memory Streaming (SMS) prefetcher in real-world CPUs, including the widely used Arm Cortex-A72.

The SMS prefetcher is **replay-** and **location-based**. It learns memory access patterns within a **spatial region**. The pattern is replayed once a load instruction at a specific address loads from a different region.

```
u8 *addrs[] = { &regA[3], &regA[0], &regA[7], &regA[2],  
               &regB[3] };  
for (u8 *addr : addrs)  
    load(addr);
```



## VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE

We find that the SMS prefetcher is **unaware of security boundaries**. It breaks platform security guarantees:

- Leaks information (such as keys) between processes
- Leaks data from Secure World (TEE) to Normal World

We disclosed our findings to Arm. Arm acknowledged and published an advisory.

